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Abstract—This paper discusses the use of models in automatic 
computer forensic analysis, and proposes and elaborates on a 
novel model for use in computer profiling, the computer 
profiling object model. The computer profiling object model is 
an information model which models a computer as objects with 
various attributes and inter-relationships. These together 
provide the information necessary for a human investigator or 
an automated reasoning engine to make judgements as to the 
probable usage and evidentiary value of a computer system. 
The computer profiling object model can be implemented so as 
to support automated analysis to provide an investigator with 
the information needed to decide whether manual analysis is 
required. 
Keywords-computer profiling; model; relationships; events 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the volume of digital evidence which must be 
examined in a computer forensic investigation increases, so 
too does the investment of a human forensic examiner’s time 
and energy into that investigation. Our previous work [1, 2] 
introduced an automated process (computer profiling) to 
conduct a forensic reconstruction of a computer system. The 
output of this process, the computer profile, allows a human 
examiner to make an informed decision regarding the likely 
value of the computer system to an investigation before 
undertaking a detailed manual forensic examination. 
Computer profiling complements existing activities in digital 
investigations by producing a formal description of a 
computer system to facilitate the formulation of hypotheses 
about the computer system’s activity. These hypotheses can 
be tested with subsequent investigation, informed by the 
preliminary analysis in the computer profile. In this work we 
describe a formal model to support computer profiling which 
was not elaborated or justified in [1, 2] and which, in any 
case, has since been refined. This formal model, the 
computer profiling object model, can be used as the basis for 
the practical implementation of computer profiling software. 
The volume and heterogeneity of digital evidence which 
might be found on a computer system poses interrelated 
challenges to digital investigations which Carrier refers to as 
the Quantity Problem and Complexity Problem respectively 
[3]. These problems mean that it is desirable for forensic 
investigators to be able to narrow the scope of an 
investigation so that manual investigative effort can be 
applied in the most efficient and effective manner. An 
automated computer forensics process, designed to be run 
prior to a detailed manual investigation, can address the 
Quantity Problem by characterising the computer system’s 
usage and discovering relationships between files, users and 
applications of interest. It can address the Complexity 
Problem by providing a description of the computer system 
at a level of abstraction appropriate to a digital investigation. 
This means describing the computer system in terms useful 
for an investigator as opposed to in terms of systems 
architecture and the minutiae of various file formats. 
Previous work [1, 2] described a process to undertake such 
an automated examination, for which the term computer 
profiling was proposed. Computer profiling is not the only 
approach to addressing the Quantity and Complexity 
Problems. Alink, Bhoedjang, Boncz, and de Vries described 
the XIRAF framework, which separates data extraction from 
analysis, employing a common XML-based output format 
for evidence extraction tools to facilitate a human analysis of 
data from different extraction tools [4]. Beebe and Clark 
surveyed various data mining techniques to deal with very 
large forensic datasets [5]. We believe that, in practice, a 
combination of techniques will be required to address the 
Quantity and Complexity Problems. Additionally, it is 
important to note that the purpose of computer profiling is 
not to produce an analysis to be relied upon in a court or to 
make any other such final decision, but to guide a more 
detailed manual computer forensic investigation and indeed 
the decision to embark upon it in the first place. 
In this work, we describe a formal model to support 
computer profiling. In section 2, we discuss existing formal 
models in digital forensics and explain why they are not 
suitable for the purposes of computer profiling. In section 3, 
we describe the computer profiling object model. We briefly 
compare the computer profiling object model to finite state 
machine based models in section 4. Finally, we conclude and 
discuss future work in section 5. 
II. MODELS AND AUTOMATED FORENSIC ANALYSIS 
A formal expression of the use and history of a computer 
system is obviously useful to the implementation of an 
automated process to analyse a computer system. In practice, 
a human investigator will not actually describe a practical 
computer system and its history according to as complete 
and formal definitions as those provided by Carrier [6]. 
Nevertheless, Carrier’s definitions can be regarded as 
potential data structures to represent a computer system’s 
history. Likewise, the formal process of forensic 
investigation employing computational models to test and 
eliminate hypotheses, such as that proposed by Gladyshev 
and Patel [7], can be regarded as a potential algorithm for 
programmatic implementation. With adequate computational 
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resources, a computer program could potentially represent 
the complete primitive and complex history of a computer 
system, and to infer all possible histories of that computer 
system. It is necessary, however, to narrow the scope of any 
automated forensic analysis in order to make that analysis 
computationally feasible. 
The objective for a model conceived to support computer 
profiling is slightly different from models conceived to 
support manual forensic analysis. The investigation process 
which Carrier describes is based on hypothesis testing [6, 8]. 
For example, the investigator hypothesises that the computer 
downloaded a particular pornographic image file, and then 
tests that hypothesis through forensic examination. The 
inferred computer history models proposed by Carrier exist 
to assist this style of investigation. 
An automated forensic analysis of a computer system 
with the intention of providing an investigator an overview 
of the computer system, its history, and possible areas of 
interest for further investigation, does not conform to the 
hypothesis testing approach envisioned by Carrier. Instead, it 
is intended to help inform the formulation of a hypothesis or 
several hypotheses about the computer system’s history. This 
sort of automated forensic analysis is computer profiling, the 
topic of this paper.  
Practical computer profiling is limited by imperfect 
records of user and system activity, imperfect understanding 
of the operation of hardware and software. These limitations 
combine with the computational enormity of exhaustively 
identifying the finite state machine which, in the models of 
Carrier and Gladyshev and Patel, represents the computer 
system at each point in time in its history. The detail of the 
finite state machine models is focussed on the demonstration 
of the possibility or otherwise of particular theories about the 
computer system’s history. This detail is included in the 
model to provide the scientific basis for hypothesis-testing 
driven manual forensic investigation. Computer profiling is 
not intended as an activity to provide digital evidence for 
presentation in a court of law, but rather as an investigative 
aid to inform the development of hypotheses about the 
computer system. As such, much of the detail in Carrier’s 
complex computer history model, or Gladyshev and Patel’s 
event reconstruction model, is focussed in inappropriate 
areas for profiling. Indeed, the approach must be 
fundamentally different. An information (rather than 
computation) model is more appropriate for use in computer 
profiling. The information model we present in this paper is 
called the computer profiling object model. 
III. THE COMPUTER PROFILING OBJECT MODEL 
The computer profiling object model provides a 
framework for the description of a computer system and its 
activity for forensic purposes. This approach to representing 
a computer system applies the principles of entity-
relationship modelling.  
A. Objects 
Entities discovered on a target computer system are 
assigned an object type, belonging to one of the four 
categories. The types have a hierarchical structure, and an 
object can be understood to have all of its super-types as its 
type, in addition to its basic type. Each object type in the 
object type hierarchy represents an element of the computer 
system at a level of abstraction most understandable to a 
human investigator. The four types of object are: 
• System objects represent configuration data, and 
correspond to stores of information specifying the 
computer system itself, system software, hardware 
etc.  
• Principal objects represent people or groups of 
people associated with the computer system insofar 
as they exist as entities on the computer system. 
Subtypes include User objects, Group objects, 
Organisation objects, and similar types. 
• Application objects represent the programs which 
have been installed on the computer system. 
• Content objects represent data files. Subtypes 
include Document objects, Image objects, Video 
objects and similar types. 
These broad categories may be divided into increasingly 
specialised object types. Each category in the computer 
profiling object model type hierarchy consists of one base 
type (the first-tier object of the category) and a number of 
subtypes. An example type hierarchy for the Principal 
category is illustrated in Fig. 1. Elements of ambiguous 
object type (such as a document containing an embedded 
image) are represented as multiple inter-related objects of 
different types.  Relationships are discussed below. 
A computer profile is a 4-tuple whose first element is a 
finite set of objects O (which are instances of the types in the 
type hierarchy) representing the entities discovered on a 
particular computer system. The set of objects belonging to a 
given object type is a subset of O. Let S be the set of all 
System objects, P be the set of all Principal objects, A be the 
set of all Application objects and C be the set of all Content 
objects: 
 O = S∪ P∪ A∪C.  (1) 
There is no intersection between S, P, A and C. A given 
object can belong to one of these category sets but not to the 
others. Each object type has a set of its own, which is a 
subset of O. We follow a simple naming convention for sets 
IndividualOrganisation Group
User
Principal
 
Figure 1.  The Principal object type and its subtypes. 
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of all objects of a given type, whereby the set is named by 
concatenating the names of the sets of all its super types, 
from the most general type to the most immediate super type, 
followed by the first letter of the type’s name. For example, 
all User objects are elements of the set PIU, which is so 
named because the immediate super type of the User type is 
the Individual type, whose super type is the Principal type 
(Principal + Individual + User). The expression x ∈PIU  
implies that the object x is a User type object. 
The various attributes of the entities represented by 
objects are expressed in the computer profiling object model 
as the object’s properties. A property is expressed as a 
predicate. The predicate asserts the accuracy of the 
description of the object or the presence of the attribute 
which is represented by the property. Properties shared by all 
objects of a type are referred to as attributes of that type. 
B. Relationships 
The objects in a profile may be related to each other, 
representing some association between the respective entities 
they represent. Relationships are the second element of the 
computer profile 4-tuple. The discovery of relationships 
between objects is potentially of great benefit to an 
investigator, as relationships link a suspect object to other 
objects, and thus can point to probable sources of evidence. 
While the type hierarchy allows an object to be placed in the 
context of types of entities comprising a computer system, a 
relationship between objects allows an examiner to 
understand an object as a piece of evidence in the context of 
an investigation. 
Relationships between objects in the computer profiling 
object model facilitate a meaningful understanding of the 
computer system by providing an understanding of the 
relationship between its various logical components. For 
example, an Individual object (object set PI), Wally, might 
be the author of four Document objects (object set CD), a, b, 
c and x. If x is identified in an investigation as an object of 
interest, then the relationships between the objects involved 
would yield a web of other potentially interesting objects. 
This is illustrated in Fig. 2. 
In a manual computer forensic investigation, a human 
investigator may be able to recognise such relationships 
intuitively; however, an automated process has no intuition. 
Identifying such relationships automatically is a key feature 
of computer profiling, allowing the human investigator’s 
time to be best prioritised in computer forensic investigation. 
Relationships such as those illustrated in Fig. 2 are 
represented in the computer profiling object model as 
predicate expressions. A relation R is a set of pairs of 
objects, where a binary predicate expresses a relationship 
between the two objects in each pair. Each type of 
relationship is described with a predicate, which captures the 
relationship between the two objects in an intuitive fashion. 
For example, in Fig. 2, an Individual object, Wally, is related 
to the four Document objects as their author. Such an 
authorship relationship would be a different type of 
relationship (and would be represented by a different 
predicate) to the relationship between a user and an 
application they employ. Let x and y be two objects, and let 
the predicate “related(x,y)” express the existence of a 
relationship between x and y. The generic relation R consists 
of all pairs of objects related by that predicate: 
 R = x, y( ) related x, y( ){ }.  (2) 
The expression xRy asserts that the objects x and y exist 
in the relationship set R, and are a pair of related objects. R 
refers to the most generic of all sets of pairs of related 
objects from O, constructed by the predicate “related”. The 
predicate “related(x,y)” is true for all relationships of any 
description. The collection AR is a set of all sets of pairs of 
related objects, including the generic relationship set R. The 
collection AR is the second component of a computer profile. 
Specific sets of pairs of related objects are named by their 
predicate, with R as a prefix. An example of such a set is the 
RAUTHOR relationship: 
RAUTHOR = p ∈P, cd ∈CD( ) author p, cd( ){ }.  (3) 
The existence of a relationship of a more specific type 
also implies the existence of the generic relation R between 
the same objects. By way of illustration: 
 
aRUSEb⇒ use a,b( )∧ related a,b( )
bRCREATEc⇒ create b, c( )∧ related b, c( )
aRAUTHORc⇒ author a, c( )∧ related a, c( )
∴R ⊇ a,b( ), b, c( ), a, c( ){ }.
 (4) 
While it is sometimes useful simply to know whether two 
objects are related at all, more often than not the nature of 
that relationship will be important. The concept of 
relationship type encapsulates the nature of the relationship, 
and describes its properties. Thus, the relationship type is 
key to understanding the relationship. Unlike objects, there is 
no concept of a type hierarchy for relationships in the 
computer profiling object model.  
a
(CD)
b
(CD)
Wally
(PI)
c
(CD)
x
(CD)
author author
author
author
 
Figure 2.  A web of related objects yielded by examining the 
relationships of the object of interest x. 
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If relationship types are to be usefully categorised, it is 
by the object types of the objects involved in the relationship 
and the properties of the relationship. When defining a 
relationship type, the most general object types which can 
participate in the particular type of relationship must be 
identified first. A predicate which describes the relationship 
between the first object in relationships of this type and the 
second, is then identified. Finally, it is determined whether 
the relationship type is transitive, commutative, or 
distributive. This information collectively forms the 
relationship’s type definition. 
Most types of relationships can only exist between 
objects of certain types. For example, an authorship 
relationship can only exist between a Principal object and a 
Document object. In order to assert that a given relationship 
type can only exist between two given types of object, we 
state that the relationship is a relation from the object type 
sets involved. The authorship relationship type given as an 
example above has the set of pairs of related objects 
RAUTHOR. Given that CD is the set of all Document objects 
and P is the set of all Principal objects, we can state that the 
authorship relationship can only exist between objects of 
these types thus: 
 RAUTHOR :CD↔ P.  (5) 
A relationship may possess three different kinds of 
property, defined by its type. The three properties are 
commutativity, transitivity, and distribution. These properties 
can imply what Bapat calls virtual relationships [9]. We call 
these relationships implicit relationships, a term we find 
more descriptive in the context of computer profiling. 
A relationship type between two object types is 
commutative if the direction of the relationship can be 
reversed meaningfully. For example, the authorship 
relationship between a Principal object and a Document 
object can be reversed. The Principal object is the author of 
the Document object, and the Document object’s author is 
the Principal object. The reversed relationship is a 
commutative implicit relationship. The generic relationship R 
is commutative, such that: 
 xRy⇒ yRx.  (6) 
It is important to note that not all commutative implicit 
relationships are symmetric. If a relationship is commutative, 
then its predicate can be inversed to express the relationship 
in the other direction. The right-hand relationship, yRx, is the 
commutative implicit relationship. The predicate which 
describes the nature of the base relationship often needs to be 
reversed in order to apply logically to the commutative 
implicit relationship. While the generic relationship R’s 
predicate “related” requires no reversal, the authorship 
relationship’s predicate “author” must be reversed to 
describe the commutative implicit relationship. The reversed 
predicate describing the commutative implicit relationship in 
the case of the authorship example would be “hasauthor”: 
 author p, cd( )⇒ hasauthor cd, p( ).  (7) 
A relationship type is transitive if two relationships of 
that type, one between x and y and another between y and z, 
imply a third relationship, between x and z. The authorship 
relationship type is not transitive, as is evident both by the 
intuitive meaning of the “author” predicate, and by the fact 
that the object types involved in this relationship type cannot 
be generalised to a common form. The most generic 
relationship type R is a transitive relationship type, such that 
xRz is a transitive implicit relationship, given by: 
 xRy ∧ yRz⇒ xRz.  (8) 
Relationship type RA distributes over the other 
relationship type RB if the distributive implicit relationship 
xRAz is obtained by:  
 xRAy ∧ yRBz⇒ xRAz.  (9) 
A relationship type RA can only distribute over 
relationship types whose first object type is the same as the 
second object type of RA. 
C. Events and Time 
The set of events which occurred in the history of the 
computer system, EVT, forms an important part of the profile 
of the system. The inclusion of the set of all events in the 
computer profile allows for the reconstruction of timelines of 
computer activity. Connecting the events in the history of the 
computer system with the objects they concern facilitates the 
tracing of the history of particular objects. This permits 
selective time-lining, focussing on the object/s which are of 
most interest to a digital investigation. Time-lining is an 
extremely important activity in many digital investigations, 
used to form and evaluate theories about the role of the 
computer system (and human suspects) in the crime or other 
event under investigation. 
The final elements of a computer profile are the set of all 
times in the history of the computer system, T, and the set of 
all events which have taken place in the history of the 
computer system, EVT. An event in EVT consists of a 5-tuple: 
 evt = t, x, y,ε,α( ).  (10) 
The variable t refers to a time in T, x is the object which 
instigated the event, y is the object which was the target of 
the event, ε is the action of the event, and α is the outcome of 
the event (either successful, unsuccessful, or unknown). 
There are three types of events in the computer profiling 
object model. The most straightforward is the recorded event 
(these were described as discovered events in [2], but we 
now prefer the term recorded events as more accurate). A 
recorded event has been found in one of the computer 
system’s logs. A computer profiling software tool parses the 
system’s logs and constructs a quintuple as described above 
for every event found in the logs. These events are all stored 
together in a repository for recorded events, represented by 
the set EVTR in the computer profiling object model. The set 
EVTR only represents the events in the history of the 
computer system which were recorded in the computer 
system’s logs, however. Any events which are not explicitly 
recorded in a log must be inferred on the basis of other 
historical information found on the computer system, such as 
file system timestamps. The set of these inferred events is 
EVTI. The union of these two sets is the complete event 
history of the computer system for which some evidence 
remains. Nevertheless, there may still be some events in the 
history of the computer system of which no evidence 
remains, and likely some events for which some evidence 
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Figure 3.  The elements of the computer profile 
remains but which were not inferred due to an imperfect 
software implementation. These are the unknown events, 
described by the set EVTU. The objective of the event 
inferring functionality of any software implementation of the 
computer profiling process is to minimise the set EVTU by 
inferring every event for which any evidence exists on the 
computer system at all. 
As EVTI supplements the information provided by EVTR, 
it would be redundant for an event to exist within both EVTR 
and EVTI. Nevertheless, the sets EVTI and EVTR may intersect 
if the same event is recorded in the target computer’s logs 
and inferred from information about objects and 
relationships. No event in EVTR or EVTI can be in EVTU. The 
following statements are true: 
 EVTR∪ EVTI( )∩ EVTU = ∅
EVTR∪ EVTI ∪ EVTU = EVT .  (11) 
The computer profiling object model facilitates the 
construction of timelines representing the history of a 
computer system, and the history of particular objects. A 
timeline is a finite sequence over a set of events, ordered by 
the timestamp of each event. The function H(o) gives the 
timeline for the specified object o. This timeline is a 
sequence over the set EVT ordered by the timestamp t of each 
event where the subject or target of the event was the object 
o. In practice, as the set EVT includes the set of unknown 
events EVTU, the most complete timeline which can possibly 
be constructed will be the sequence of events over the union 
of the sets EVTI and EVTR, rather than over all of EVT. For 
practical investigations with computer profiling, the union of 
the sets EVTI and EVTR should substitute for the set EVT in 
the definitions given in this section. By incorporating 
inferred events into the timeline of computer activity, this 
time-lining technique produces a more complete history of 
the computer system than could be obtained from the 
computer’s logs alone. It is envisioned that in practice, an 
investigator will mostly wish to construct timelines about 
people of interest to the case (Principal objects), suspicious 
software (Application objects), or suspicious data files such 
as pornographic images or significant documents 
(represented by various types of Content objects). 
The timeline for o is a sequence over the set of events 
relevant to o, EVTo, which is defined: 
EVTo ⊆ EVT
EVTo = t, x, y,ε,α( )∈EVT x = o( )∨ y = o( ){ }.  (12) 
The timeline given by H(o) contains as many events as 
exist in the set EVTo: 
 
 
H o( ) = evt0 , evt1, evt2 ,…, evt EVTo .  (13) 
The timeline given by H(o) is ordered in ascending order 
by the value of t for each event in EVTo. In practical computer 
systems, the accuracy of timestamps generated by computer 
clocks is highly suspect [10, 11], and the accuracy of the 
function H(o) is therefore limited by the accuracy of the 
timestamps of each event. The function H(o) was 
implemented in our previous work [2], and we are currently 
working on techniques to evaluate the accuracy of 
timestamps and events in timelines. 
D. Computer Profile 
A complete computer profile is composed of the 
elements described above, whose interdepencies are 
illustrated in Fig. 3. A computer profile cp consists of the 
finite sets of all objects O, all relationships AR, all times in 
the history of the computer system T and all events EVT. That 
is: 
 cp = O,R,T ,EVT( ).  (14) 
Such a computer profile provides a useful repository of 
information about the computer system. The nature of the 
model supports the formal expression of investigative 
theories at a layer of abstraction which is reasonably close to 
a user level view of the computer system. The computer 
profiling object model breaks down the computer system 
into objects representing entities which are discrete and 
typed from a user’s perspective. The relationships between 
objects naturally support graphical visualisation. The 
computer profiling object model also captures event 
information, permitting the investigator to form timelines 
about interesting objects. The combination of all this 
information provides a logical framework for the formulation 
of hypotheses about a computer system and its history. 
IV. COMPARISON TO EXISTING MODELS 
A computer profile consists of a set of objects 
representing the components, files, programs and people 
associated with a computer system, a set of relationships 
between those objects, and an event history. A computer 
profile facilitates investigative reasoning on the basis of 
information about objects and relationships between objects. 
This information facilitates automated reasoning which can 
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infer events in the computer system’s history which are not 
recorded in the computer system’s logs. Timelines of 
computer activity can be automatically constructed from the 
computer system’s event history. It is possible to create 
timelines both of the entire computer system, or just of 
objects of interest to an investigator (such as suspects or 
suspicious files).  
The purpose of the computer profiling object model is to 
facilitate the automated description of a previously unknown 
computer system. This description, the profile, can then be 
used to provide context for further investigation, and for the 
formulation of hypotheses about the computer system’s 
history. The purpose of the computer profiling object model 
is therefore different from the finite state machine-based 
models of Gladyshev and Patel [7, 12], and Carrier [6, 8]. 
These models are both intended to test hypotheses about the 
history of a computer system. Despite the differences in 
intentions, we will briefly compare our model to Carrier’s 
complex computer history model at the same layer of 
abstraction as the computer profiling object model, which we 
call CP. The concept of abstraction layers is inherent to 
Carrier’s complex computer history model. 
The set of events which occurred in the history of the 
computer system EVT is a subset of the set of all possible 
events Σ at the CP layer of abstraction. In practice, there will 
always be some unknown events (or at least it is certainly 
true that the reverse can never be proven) and therefore: 
 EVTU ⊆ ΣCP − EVTR − EVTI( ).  (15) 
As a result, the complete set of all events which did occur 
will not be attainable. For forensic event reconstruction, the 
subset of Σ which is not in the set EVT is irrelevant, leaving 
only the much smaller subset EVTU unidentified. For 
hypothesis testing, there would be no way to differentiate 
between an event which occurred but was not detected by the 
computer profiling software, an event in EVTU, and an event 
which did not occur, an event in Σ but not in EVTU. 
The first two elements of the computer profile, the set of 
all objects O and the set of all relationships AR, together 
describe everything that is known of the final state of the 
computer system q at the CP layer of abstraction. Presently 
there is no capacity to model past states of objects or 
relationships in the computer profiling object model. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The computer profiling object model provides a 
framework for development of automated computer forensic 
examination and analysis tools. The model facilitates digital 
evidence representation, computer activity tracing and 
investigative reasoning. The model accomplishes this using 
simply constructed data structures and logical concepts.  
At the moment, the computer profiling object model 
models events as simple 5-tuples, consisting of a timestamp, 
two references to discovered objects, and two strings, one 
describing the “action” of the event and another describing 
its outcome. Events have an object for their subject and 
target. Intuitively, it is obvious that certain types of objects 
can only be the subject or target of certain actions. Certain 
actions change the state of the subject or target objects. The 
addition of the concept of state for objects and relationships, 
and actions which can affect those states, could facilitate the 
reconstruction of the state history of the computer system. 
We intend this to be a topic of future research. 
It is intended that the computer profiling object model be 
a practical framework for the automated description of 
computer systems. Practical experimentation and evaluation 
will yield improvements to the model. Our previous work 
has documented some of our past experimentation with a 
research software prototype tool. While suited to controlled 
experiments, the prototype software lacks the breadth of 
feature extraction components which make it practical for 
use in real digital investigations. We are presently working 
on a more advanced prototype, which will be suited for real 
digital investigations. Experimentation with this prototype 
should lead us to refine and improve our model. 
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